Why a U.S.-China Trade Deal will not Ensure an Effective Global Trade Governance by Kazzi, Habib
European Scientific Journal June 2019 edition Vol.15, No.16 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
191 
Why a U.S.-China Trade Deal will not Ensure an 





Professor of International Trade Law (Lebanese University), 
Lawyer at the Paris Bar (France), 
Senior Consultant 
 
Doi:10.19044/esj.2019.v15n16p191     URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2019.v15n16p191 
 
Abstract 
 This contribution makes the case for the building of a constructive 
partnership between China and global players, including the United States, the 
only way to tackle China’s trade policy challenges and ensure effective global 
trade governance. After months-long negotiations, the United States and 
China may put the finishing touches on a trade deal to end their trade war. 
Despite advances secured by the U.S., it should be admitted that once again, 
when it comes to negotiations with China, it is a matter of much ado about 
nothing. China will remain a unique and pressing challenge for the WTO and 
its trading partners. It appears that China’s trade distortions are the outcome 
of a singular China’s political and legal system promoting a socialist market 
economy with a state-led and mercantilist trade regime. The trade deal, 
through its enforcement offices, will not be able to prevent the U.S. from 
imposing unilateral sanctions against China, nor will it be able to minimise 
strategic competition between the two States. In this context, pursuing 
unilateral measures and sanctions to obtain structural reforms protecting U.S. 
workers, farmers and businesses is largely a futile exercise. Rather, 
modernizing the China’s economic and legal architecture than reforming it 
should be the cornerstone of a realistic, multifaceted and long-term approach 
based on a constructive diplomacy, including the creation of new institutions 
such as a bilateral investment treaty with China and the accession to the Trans-
Pacific Partnership, as well as a joint working group on WTO reform with 
like-minded States capable of exerting upward pressure on China so as to 
revitalize WTO rules and functions.   
 
Keywords: U.S.-China Trade Deal, Global Trade Governance, Trade 
Barriers, China’s Foreign Investment Law, WTO Reform. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy delivered in 
December 18, 2017 marked a significant turning point in the U.S. foreign 
policy. Characterizing the world as a competitive arena rather than a 
“community of nations” or an “international community”, this statement 
identifies two primary rivals, Russia and China, named as "revisionist powers" 
on the grounds that these two States “(…) challenge American power, 
influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity. 
They are determined to make economies less free and less fair”. 
 As of this date, only one year after coming into office, as part of 
“America first foreign policy”, Trump’s administration steadily and constantly 
reaffirms that the United States “will no longer tolerate economic aggression 
or unfair trading practices”. 
 With China, the U.S. government’s position is based on the deficit in 
the trade balance which is expected to hit a record $400 billion and the analysis 
of China’s record as a WTO member since 2001. WTO membership comes 
with expectations that an acceding member not only will strictly adhere to 
WTO rules, but also will support and pursue open, market-oriented policies. 
The pursuit of market-oriented policies means not only strictly adhering to the 
agreed rules but also observing in good faith the fundamental principles that 
run throughout the many WTO agreements, which include non-discrimination, 
openness, reciprocity, fairness and transparency. Clearly, China has not made 
sufficient progress in transitioning toward a market economy. This country 
continues to embrace a state-led, non-market and mercantilist approach to the 
economy and trade (USTR, Report March 2018).  
 China’s strategy results in vast and sophisticated policies that often 
evade WTO disciplines and fundamental principles, causing serious prejudice 
to markets, industries and workers in the United States and other WTO 
Members, even as China reaps enormous benefits from its WTO membership. 
China’s trade policies and practices in various specific areas concretely cause 
particular concerns for U.S. stakeholders. The key concerns in each of these 
areas relate primarily to China’s industrial policies, including forced 
technology transfer, State-owned Enterprises (SOEs), investment restrictions 
and subsidies to its domestic industries. Other key concerns include non-tariff 
trade barriers, protection of intellectual property rights, cyber intrusions and 
technology theft, services market access and agricultural trade, among other 
areas. 
 Faced with almost two decades of China’s intransigence, the United 
States has adopted a more aggressive multifaceted strategy. On the grounds of 
national security under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and 
under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the United States imposed duties 
on $250 billion dollars’ worth of Chinese imports, and is using several 
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available tools to respond to the challenges presented by China, including 
domestic trade remedies, bilateral negotiations, WTO litigation and strategic 
engagement with like-minded trading partners.   
 China accuses the U.S. of launching the largest trade war in economic 
history with the objective of embracing broader structural changes, which are 
seen by some as a way to contain its rise. In reprisal for U.S. measures, China 
has hit back with tariffs on about $110 billion dollars of U.S. goods, including 
many agricultural products, in excess of China’s bound rates. In addition, the 
China’s General Administration of Customs assesses duties on U.S. products 
based on higher “reference prices,” rather than the declared value, effectively 
resulting in even higher tariffs. Tariff escalations between the U.S. and China 
were, ultimately, of particular concern given the scale of trade items covered 
by their additional tariffs given that the U.S. has imposed tariffs on half of its 
imports from China, while China has imposed retaliatory tariffs on two-thirds 
of its imports from the U.S.  
 The one-year trade war between the world’s two largest economies has 
raised costs, roiled financial markets, shrunk U.S. farm exports and disrupted 
manufacturing supply chains (REUTERS, March 19, 2019). As part of an 
effort to defuse the crisis, plans for trade talks were made between Trump and 
Xi Jinping during the Group of 20 summit in Buenos Aires in December 2018. 
After tough negotiations, warring parties are on the verge of reaching a 
comprehensive agreement exceeding 150 pages.    
 The main legacy of this agreement is the restoration of a bilateral 
dialogue. While all bilateral trade mechanisms between these countries have 
all been cut off since Trump took office, this agreement may constitute an 
appropriate institutional framework to ease trade relations and bridge the gap 
between the viewpoints about multilateral and bilateral issues. At the same 
time, there is no reason to turn over-optimistic. Experts point out that an easing 
of tensions between the warring parties is not going to stop the slowdown 
already seen in the global economy (NEE LEE, 2019). Worse still, there would 
probably be a lack of progress in addressing concretely several critical and 
thorny issues between the U.S. and China, including effective enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, subsidies for State-owned enterprises and Chinese 
technological champions, investment restrictions, the control of local 
governments’ policies, and the use by the Chinese government of its judicial 
system and legislations with the goal to discipline the domestic market and 
achieve industrial policy objectives, among others. 
 Getting China to agree to stop doing this will be close to impossible. 
That means global uncertainties brought about by tensions between the U.S. 
and China may drag on longer. All these current issues remind players of 
global trade of the need for an urgent establishment of a sustainable and 
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realistic multifaceted “win-win” strategic dialogue that benefits both sides 
and, ultimately, optimizes the multilateral trading system.    
 To better understand what is at stake, the remaining article is organized 
as follows. Section I stresses political and legal grounds of China’s economic 
model. Section II focuses on the new China’s foreign investment legal 
framework. Section III examines main features and issues of the current U.S. 
multi-faceted strategy with China. Section IV proposes some 
recommendations through the building of a “constructive partnership” 
between China and its major trading partners, the only way to ensure a more 
realistic and sustainable global trade governance. Finally, Section V 
concludes.  
 
SECTION I: China’s Socialist Market Economy and Legal System 
 During trade bilateral negotiations, U.S. negotiators had a lot of 
ambition that the State apparatus was finally going to retreat and the market 
would thrive. But today, the outcomes of these negotiations symbolize the gap 
between U.S. stakeholders’ expectations and Chinese commitments and 
performance. They also show how Trump’s hopes of winning genuine 
structural changes in China’s economic model are colliding with the entire 
thrust of Xi’s rule, which has been all about bolstering Beijing’s role in the 
economy while preserving Communist Party control. State involvement in the 
economy indeed remains considerable. Almost two decades after China joined 
the WTO, the Chinese state maintains a tight grip on virtually all economic 
activity. To fully appreciate the challenges faced by foreign investors and 
exporters, and the intransigence of Chinese authorities to adopt structural 
changes, it is vital to achieve a thorough examination of economic, political 
and legal grounds of current China’s proactive and state-driven industrial and 
economic policies such as “Made in China 2025”.   
 
1) Economic Environment 
 China’s economic model is undergoing profound transformation 
(CANUTO, 2019). While the Chinese economy continued to be a major driver 
of global economic growth, China’s growth has been in a downslide trend 
since 2011. It has become hard for the Chinese government to push through 
credible reforms as the economy slows. Real GDP growth has been 
moderating as the economy adjusts to the "new normal", which implies more 
stable, albeit lower, growth rates of around 7% per year in the foreseeable 
future. On the other hand, China’s economic structure has gradually 
rebalanced growth from investment to consumption, from external to internal 
demand, and from manufacturing to services. In this context, China is not 
willing to pay any kind of cost for structural changes in the coming years. The 
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goal is to ensure a balance between the ambition to steer the economy toward 
a high-tech and dominant position, and the need to avoid economic turbulence.   
 
2) Legal and Political Regime 
An in-depth analysis of China’s Constitution, relevant directives and 
pronouncements by China’s leadership, legislative and regulatory measures 
issued by the Chinese government, China’s industrial plans and the actions of 
the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party leaves no doubt 
that the Chinese state still maintains control over economic decision-making 
in that country. 
 Consultations and dialogue on high policy level for several years 
indicate that China has no plans to significantly change its basic approach to 
the economy. As China explained in the report that it circulated in connection 
with its July 2018 trade policy review at the WTO, “[w]hile socialism with 
Chinese characteristics has entered a new era, the basic dimension of the 
Chinese context – that China is still and will long remain in the primary stage 
of socialism – has not changed.” China added that it is committed to a 
“socialist market economy” and to improving “the relationship between the 
government and the market.” In China’s view, an improved relationship seems 
to indicate that the State plays its role better in managing the economy, not 
that the State ceases to intervene and allows market forces to determine 
outcomes. 
 The government and the Communist Party have constitutional 
mandates to develop a “socialist legal system” and a “socialist market 
economy with Chinese characteristics.”  
 The preamble of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 
stresses that “After the founding of the People's Republic, the transition of 
Chinese society from a new democratic to a socialist society was effected step 
by step (…).China will stay in the primary stage of socialism for a long period 
of time. The basic task of the nation is to concentrate its efforts on socialist 
modernization along the road of Chinese-style socialism. Under the guidance 
of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the 
important thought of 'Three Represents', the Chinese people of all nationalities 
will continue to adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship, follow the 
socialist road, persist in reform and opening-up, steadily improve socialist 
institutions, develop a socialist market economy ”. 
 In line with this vision, article 5 of the Constitution provides for a 
socialist legal system and rule of law by stressing that “The People's Republic 
of China practices ruling the country in accordance with the law and building 
a socialist country of law. The state upholds the uniformity and dignity of the 
socialist legal system”. 
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 Going still further, Article 6 of the Constitution provides that, “[i]n the 
primary stage of socialism, the state upholds the basic economic system in 
which public ownership is dominant and diverse forms of ownership develop 
side by side (. . . .)”. Article 7 also provides that “[t]he state-owned economy, 
that is, the socialist economy with ownership by the whole people, is the 
leading force in the national economy. The state ensures the consolidation and 
development of the state-owned economy.” Under article 11 of the 
Constitution, “The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the non-
public sectors of the economy such as the individual and private sectors of the 
economy. The State encourages, supports and guides the development of the 
non-public sectors of the economy and, in accordance with law, exercises 
supervision and control over the non-public sectors of the economy”. 
 Similarly, the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
provides: “The Communist Party of China leads the people in developing the 
socialist market economy. It unwaveringly consolidates and develops the 
public sector of the economy and unswervingly encourages, supports and 
guides the development of the non-public sector.” 
 The prevalence of the State apparatus and its failure to embrace the 
pursuit of open, market-oriented policies, was recently underlined by the WTO 
Secretariat in its report prepared for the seventh trade policy review of China 
in 2018 highlighting that “The Government has been trying to address these 
issues by focusing on the quality and sustainability rather than the quantity of 
growth. Under the 13
th 
Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), the authorities intend to 
continue the process of structural economic reform, which includes the 
promotion of private sector participation in the economy, as well as the reform 
of SOEs, while keeping the preponderance of public ownership.”  
 To fulfill these mandates, the Government and the Party direct and 
channel economic actors to meet the State’s planning targets. They permit 
market forces to operate only to the extent that they accord with the objectives 
of national economic and industrial policies. When there is conflict between 
market outcomes and State objectives, the Government and the Party intervene 
to ensure that the State’s objectives prevail. 
This diagnosis has been confirmed with the recent passing of the 
China’s Foreign Investment Law. While Chinese analysts stress that this law 
reflects China’s desire to improve its economy and legal system, it is unlikely 
that this new legal instrument will level the playing field for foreign investors. 
Foreign business community and legal consultants still express skepticism 
about how far the law would protect foreign firms’ interests, given the China’s 
political system and the lack of rule of law in this country. The risk is high that 
the Investment law was nothing but smoke and mirrors used by Chinese 
government and CCP in response to the trade war with the United States and 
to avoid an overhaul of the current political regime and foreign policy. Indeed, 
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the larger problems are deeply rooted in China’s political system. The reality 
is that, so long as the CCP remains focused on asserting its authority across all 
aspects of Chinese society, foreign companies will need to operate in such a 
way that their business is not perceived as undermining CCP rule or social 
stability. Not surprisingly, and like other Chinese legislations and directives, 
article 1 reiterates that this law meets economic objectives made to serve a 
model of society and a national development policy. It provides that “This Law 
is formulated on the basis of the Constitution to further expand the scope of 
opening-up, to actively promote foreign investment, to protect the lawful rights 
and interests of foreign investment, to make new grounds in opening up on all 
fronts, and to promote the healthy development of the socialist market 
economy”. 
Moreover, in light of China’s approach to foreign policy in recent 
years, it remains unlikely that foreign investors will be treated by the Chinese 
government as anything other than an extension of the interests of their own 
country of origin. As long as Chinese leadership sees its own industry giants 
and businesspeople as manifestations of China’s own national interests, it will 
treat foreign entities and citizens in the same way. If the rule of law is then 
abrogated to exact retribution for the actions of foreign governments on an ad 
hoc basis, legislation such as the pending Foreign Investment Law will be 
rendered ineffective, if not meaningless, over the long term.  
In this context, how do Chinese authorities grasp these arguments?  
 From China’s view, recurrent accusations from U.S. stakeholders 
about its WTO compliance lack factual and legal basis (Reuters, February 5, 
2018). Too often, a considerable part of these accusations against China 
exceeds its commitments to the WTO. Rather, USTR’s reports on this topic 
would be based on U.S. domestic law rather than WTO agreements and 
multilateral rules. The Chinese government also notes that this country plays 
a constructive role at such a decisive moment as this for the WTO. Indeed, 
China clearly opposes unilateralism and protectionism and, as a result, firmly 
acknowledges the crucial role played by the WTO in preserving fair, 
predictable, and transparent trade rules. Its support to the multilateral trading 
system is recently reflected in the acceptance to participate in the reform of 
the WTO, in particular the dispute settlement system, to adapt it to a changing 
global economy. While, the volume of Chinese trade covered by FTAs 
remains small, China also continues to grant unilateral trade preferences to 
LDCs. As of December 2017, duty-free treatment on 97% of tariff lines was 
granted to LDCs (WTO Secretariat, 2018). 
 
SECTION II: China’s Foreign Investment Policy and Laws 
Foreign investment has become a significant driving force in the rapid 
development of the Chinese economy. Until October 2018, almost 950,000 
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foreign-invested companies with more than U.S. $2.1 trillion foreign capital 
were registered to operate in China. As the second largest economy in the 
world, China received record foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2017, ranked 
just behind the U.S. (HEALEY and WANG, 2019). 
In accordance with WTO commitments, the Catalogue of Industries 
for the Guidance of Foreign Investment (Investment Catalogue), as revised in 
2017, was long considered as the main instrument used to guide FDI in China. 
Under the Catalogue, foreign investment projects are classified in the 
encouraged category and in a “Negative List”, which contains a list of 
industries where FDI is restricted or prohibited. Foreign-invested projects 
(FIPs) in China are subject to approval or to record-filing. Projects subject to 
approval are listed in a specific catalogue, while most projects not included in 
it were subject to record-filing. Approval requires the examination of the 
investment project, and a number of conditions must be met. Projects in the 
encouraged category are eligible for preferential treatment, for example, 
customs duty exemptions for the importation of equipment. The 2017 revision 
of the Catalogue encourages FDI in, inter alia, advanced manufacturing, high 
technology, the energy saving and environmental protection industry, and the 
modern services industry (WTO Secretariat Report, 2018).  
Under the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS 
Agreement), China committed to eliminate some measures such as those that 
require or provide benefits for the incorporation of local inputs (known as local 
content requirements) in the manufacturing process, or measures that restrict 
a firm’s imports to an amount related to its exports or related to the amount of 
foreign exchange a firm earns (known as trade balancing requirements). In its 
WTO accession agreement, China also agreed to eliminate export 
performance, local content and foreign exchange balancing requirements from 
its laws, regulations and other measures, and not to enforce the terms of any 
contracts imposing these requirements. In addition, China agreed that it would 
no longer condition importation or investment approvals on these 
requirements or on requirements such as technology transfer and offsets 
(WTO, China Report, 2018).. 
However, China still utilizes various investment restrictions designed 
to protect domestic manufacturers and services suppliers from foreign 
competitors and to encourage technology transfer. This country still commits 
acts of discrimination against foreign investors that do not permit level playing 
field, through an administrative filing-record or approval system providing a 
case-by-case review of any foreign investment. While no technology transfer 
requirements are imposed on foreign investment projects according to the 
Chinese authorities, FDI involving investments in Chinese domestic 
enterprises may be subject to national security reviews if the FDI is related to 
defense, or is deemed to have an influence on national security. In this respect, 
European Scientific Journal June 2019 edition Vol.15, No.16 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
199 
foreign investors regularly express a deep concern about the use of a broad 
definition of “national security,” which includes factors such as economic, 
cultural and financial security, by China’s regulatory authorities when 
implementing the negative list. The United States is also concerned about 
many other aspects of the national security review, including its application to 
greenfield investments and the invitation for Chinese competitors to nominate 
transactions for review. In addition, China’s investment restrictions are often 
accompanied by other problematic industrial policies, such as the development 
of China-specific standards and the increased use of subsidies. At the same 
time, foreign investors in China also continue to voice concerns about lack of 
transparency in China’s foreign investment policy, inconsistent enforcement 
of laws and regulations, weak IPR protection, corruption and a legal system 
that is unreliable and fails to enforce contracts and judgments (USTR Report, 
2019). 
To allay foreign investor’ concerns, and as a response to U.S.-China 
Talks, the first China‘s Foreign Investment Law (Investment Law) has been 
adopted by the 2nd Session of the 13th National People's Congress on March 
15, 2019 and shall take effect on January 1, 2020.  This instrument streamlines 
the current foreign investment law regime by replacing existing regulations 
for joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises with a five-year 
transition period, and eases foreign concerns about China’s investment 
environment. Wang Chen, vice chairman of parliament’s standing committee, 
pointed out that full session of the legislature that the law “[i]ncludes many 
stipulations that ensure domestic and foreign enterprises are subject to a 
unified set of rules and compete on a level playing field”. It will “create a 
stable, transparent and predictable market environment featuring fair 
competition”, he added. At the same time, this legal instrument should also 
ultimately work to China’s interests. Liberalizing and facilitating foreign 
investment should increase confidence in China’s investment environment and 
attract more high-quality investment, especially in areas of high-tech and 
innovation which will contribute to China’s overarching policy objectives set 
out in the 13th Five Year Plan and “Made in China 2025”.  
Literally, the Investment Law aims at offering foreigners equal 
treatment, greater market access and better legal protection. For this purpose, 
it includes rules on investment promotion (Chapter 2), protection (Chapter 3), 
and management (Chapter 4). Amongst main changes, it guarantees equal 
treatment for domestic and foreign business, and bans forced technology 
transfer and illegal government “interference” in foreign business practices. 
More importantly, it fully implements pre-establishment national treatment 
plus a “Negative List” for foreign investments, expanding market access for 
foreign investors whilst increasing the predictability and transparency of 
foreign investment administration.  
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While the Investment Law makes a positive step towards improving 
the legal system in China with “promising results” (HEALEY and WANG, 
2019), some analysts stress that this legislation clearly “fails to address US 
Concerns” and, more generally, “raises concerns” for foreign investors as a 
whole (LOWE, 2019).   
Progresses achieved do not effectively serve as an answer to long-
standing U.S. demands on these issues. Analysts note that the way this law 
was “rushed through”, the problematic deadline set for the change of original 
corporate organizational forms, and the vague wording of many of its 42 
clauses are casting some serious doubts on authorities’ ability to enforce the 
legislation after it is passed (LOWE, 2019). 
 While the Investment Law will have major ramifications for all foreign 
companies in China for the foreseeable future, it was rushed through a 
significantly shortened deliberative process. The legislation was approved just 
three months after a first draft was debated, including a three-day legislative 
session and a short period for solicitation of public comments. Few and 
scattered negotiations and one-way communication with foreign companies 
and trading partners have marked drafting and voting processes. This 
instrument has, in fact, served as an olive branch to ease trade tensions with 
Washington by demonstrating China’s commitment to using reform and 
innovation to ensure its foreign investment legal system develops and 
improves. It is striking to note that the content and scope of this law have not 
been discussed during trade talks, thus not enabling U.S. negotiators to impose 
concrete amendments and guarantees (QINGJIANG and WEIHUAN, 2019).   
 The draft’s expedited review and the fact that this law is reduced in 
scope mean that its ambiguous provisions will be dictated by circulars and 
implementing regulations and are unlikely to change facts on the ground in the 
near term.  
 Apart from the fact that Beijing still protects the interests of domestic 
businesses by maintaining the Catalogue of Foreign-Invested Industries and 
the Negative List, article 20 allows the State to take control of foreign 
investment in the interest of the public. Yet what defines public interest is not 
clear.  
 Article 22 states that “Administrative organs and their employees must 
not force the transfer of technology through the use of administrative 
measures”. By protecting the intellectual property rights of foreign investors 
and foreign-invested enterprises, Chinese authorities encourage technological 
cooperation based “on the principle of voluntariness and business rules”. 
However, such provisions are unlikely to change anything substantial on the 
ground as the Chinese government has often claimed that such theft does not 
occur as a matter of policy, despite rampant evidence to the contrary. While 
Chinese officials deny companies are required to hand over technology, 
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foreign businesses face pressures including requirements in industries such as 
auto-manufacturing and pharmaceuticals to work through state-owned 
partners, which requires to them provide technology to companies the ruling 
Communist Party hopes will become their competitors. This fact is coupled 
with the focus on “administrative methods” that might mean officials still are 
free to use other tactics to pressure companies to hand over know-how.  
 In the same way, article 40 allows China to take “corresponding 
measures” in response to prohibitive or restrictive investment practices by 
foreign countries. This raises the concern that China will find grounds to exact 
retribution on foreign companies in response to investment screens abroad, 
even if there is no legitimate national security concern.  
 In addition, articles 6 states that foreign investors and foreign-invested 
enterprises shall not harm national security or the public interest, without any 
further elaboration. Article 35 further states that any investment that affects 
or may affect national security will undergo a security review leading to “final 
decisions”. This vague language echoes article 59 of China’s 2015 National 
Security Law, which originally mandated security reviews for such 
investments. Together, these provisions essentially give the state and, in turn, 
the CCP free rein to intervene in a wide range of investment activity, signaling 
to foreign investors that they are better of avoiding any investment in an area 
that may be construed as politically sensitive or threatening.  
 In the same vein, the wording of article 42 is problematic. This article 
only gives foreign businesses a five-year grace period to reorganize their 
existing corporate structure, mainly joint ventures or wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises. By not allowing foreign-invested enterprises to retain their 
existing corporate structures till the end of their current contract, the short 
timeframe puts pressure on foreign companies whilst at the same time offering 
opportunity for Chinese shareholders to unfairly renegotiate.  
 As per article 31, the provisions of the China’s Company Law" and 
China’s Partnership Enterprises Law apply to the organizational forms and 
institutional frameworks of foreign-invested companies. As a result, it is 
unlikely that foreign businesses will find acceptable, for example, to set up a 
Communist party branch within the companies, as required by article 19 of 
China’s Company Law. Indeed, the Company Law mandates a direct CCP 
presence within companies. Article 19 declares that companies must support 
the activities of any CCP branches established within the firm, in accordance 
with the Constitution of the Communist Party of China (‘Party Constitution’). 
It is clear that these CCP branches allow the government to extend its tentacles 
into every significant business organization in China. 
 Last but not least, and despite further deregulation and institutional 
reform, serious concerns also remain on how law’s enforcement will be 
handled by local governments. China has often embraced protectionist policies 
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at the local level. If the open-up policy involves sectors that have long been 
dominated by local government-owned enterprises, it means these 
government-run companies will now face foreign competition. Given that 
their performance is tied to local governments’ fiscal [health], it remains to be 
seen if local authorities will fully execute the central government’s policies.  
In sum, it is doubtful that the Investment Law will lead to a level 
domestic playing field for overseas firms and investors. Irrespective of 
Chinese government’s written undertakings, this State has a good track record 
of changing low-level regulations to protect domestic industries. The law 
brings more clarity and enshrines equal treatment in law but doesn't offer 
complete protection against political influence. Like all Chinese legislations 
and regulations, this law will continue to provide the CCP with a great deal of 
room to intervene, albeit not explicitly. 
 
SECTION III: Features and Issues of the U.S. Multi-faceted Strategy 
A few months after taking office, Trump announced, in his National 
Security Strategy 2017, that: “We will work with our partners to contest 
China’s unfair trade and economic practices and restrict its acquisition of 
sensitive technologies”. 
Taking this line of thought further, the U.S. President claimed in his 
State of the Union Address 2019 the following:   
“As we work to defend our people's safety, we must also ensure our 
economic resurgence continues at a rapid pace.[…] To build on our incredible 
economic success, one priority is paramount -- reversing decades of 
calamitous trade policies. We are now making it clear to China that after years 
of targeting our industries, and stealing our intellectual property, the theft of 
American jobs and wealth has come to an end. 
 In response to President’s allegations, USTR Robert Lighthizer 
underscored that:  
 “In his State of the Union address, President Trump outlined a 
visionary trade agenda that resonates across party lines and will accelerate 
America’s manufacturing resurgence, expand export opportunities for our 
farmers, ranchers and small businesses, and promote America’s leadership in 
today’s digital economy.  The President is confronting China’s unfair trade 
practices, working to open new trade negotiations with countries around the 
world, and replacing NAFTA with an innovative, landmark agreement for the 
21st century – the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).  This 
new agreement is a model for all future trade deals”. 
 These statements describe the current U.S. strategy against China’s 
non-market economic system and state-led, mercantilist trade regime, accused 
of incrementally distorting international trade to the detriment of the United 
States and other WTO members. To encourage China to fundamentally change 
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its approach to the economy and trade, the United States attempts to 
consolidate a multifaceted strategy combining both bilateral and international 
mechanisms. Over the past year, the United States has also increased unilateral 
corrective actions to limit adverse effects of China’s harmful policies and 
practices.  
 These mechanisms need to be revised as they only permitted modest 
results to date.  
 
1) Bilateral Dialogue 
 Bilateral dialogue is, for a long time, the main channel used between 
the parties in response to China’s challenges. Since China’s accession to the 
WTO, both parties have repeatedly pursued formal, high-level dialogues 
through various entities, including previous dialogues like the U.S.-China 
Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), the U.S.-China Strategic 
Economic Dialogue (SED) and the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue (S&ED) and a new dialogue known as the U.S.-China 
Comprehensive Economic Dialogue (CED), which was launched under 
Trump’s administration in April 2017. 
 Through many years of intensive high-level dialogues, the United 
States indeed urged China to pursue market-based policies and practices and 
become a more responsible member of the WTO. But, unfortunately, these 
efforts largely failed because the Chinese government and the Chinese 
Communist Party were not sufficiently committed to adopting a true market 
economy or taking on a more responsible role at the WTO. While the United 
States has put all its resources and uses all its influence, the result is still an 
isolated, incremental progress. Considering that these dialogues are largely 
ineffective, President Trump directed USTR to initiate, in August 2017, an 
investigation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 with the goal to 
address and limit the adverse effects of certain state-led, mercantilist and non-
market policies and practices of the Chinese government. This investigation 
aimed only to analyzing policies and practices related to technology transfer, 
intellectual property and innovation.  
 As a result, USTR issued, in March 2018, a first report analyzing how 
China has pursued unreasonable and discriminatory acts, policies and 
practices that harm U.S. intellectual property rights, innovation and 
technology development, whilst urging China’s officials to initiate structural 
reforms. The Section 301 investigation and remedies prompted numerous 
high-level discussions between the United States and China. A second report, 
issued in November 2018, found that China did not take any of the actions 
called for by the United States, nor did it commit that it would take any of 
those actions in the future. These two reports were the grounds for increasing 
tariffs.  
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 One more demonstration of the weakness of bilateral dialogue was the 
exclusion of the U.S. administration and businesses during the course of 
enacting the new Foreign Investment Law. That reflects, if such were 
necessary, the unwillingness of China to make deep and structural changes. 
The Trump’s administration has missed an opportunity to address this specific 
legislation in bilateral trade talks. While the United States could not 
fundamentally alter the course of China’s political system, it would have to 
press for definitive structural reforms by pointing to this legislation as a key 
metric for whether China is making good on its commitments to treat U.S. 
businesses and investors fairly, irrespective of broader trends in the two 
countries’ relations. Beyond this, Trump’s administration would have to 
secure enforcement mechanisms that prevent U.S. investors and companies 
from being illegitimately drawn into bilateral disputes by having their activity 
stifled on the vague basis of “national security” or “corresponding measures”, 
among others. Such a possibility is an unacceptable risk if China seeks to 
ensure a stable, predictable investment regime that adheres to the rule of law 
and treats foreign investors fairly. 
 In the above-mentioned context, the awareness of the need for 
cooperation and damages caused by the trade war to both economies and 
global trade will probably lead to an agreement in a near future that could 
reshuffle the cards by creating new opportunities and more trusting 
environment.  
 Nonetheless, such an agreement will probably not fulfil the hopes that 
some place in it. The bilateral approach chosen by the U.S. will not be enough 
to ensure a sustainable remedy to China’s challenges and effective global trade 
governance. Political one-upmanship and media campaign led by the Trump’s 
administration have only resulted in limited China’s concessions. A thorough 
analysis of the U.S. position during the negotiations has shown that the U.S. 
authorities pursued five broader purposes as key conditions for ending the 
trade war: 1) the reduction of the trade deficit with China, 2) a sweeping 
overhaul of China’s economic and legal model, 3) the stability of the exchange 
rate between the dollar and the Chinese yuan, 4) China’s compliance with 
WTO disciplines and its effective participation in the reform of WTO’s 
architecture and rules, and 5) a unilateral verification and enforcement 
mechanism, including the maintenance of tariffs imposed since July 2018 by 
the United States on Chinese goods to ensure that Beijing complies with the 
trade agreement. 
 Despite important commitments, this agreement will not be able to 
address several core, thorny issues between the U.S. and China, nor will it 
change the way China’s economy operates. The two sides should reach an 
agreement on some trade issues, including China’s expansion of imports of 
over a trillion dollars of U.S. goods in the next six years to reduce its trade 
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surplus with the U.S. A consensus is also tending to emerge on key issues, 
including enhancement of protection of intellectual property rights, 
commitments by Chinese government not to force technology transfer and 
widening access to China’s markets. Beijing has agreed to open its financial 
and agricultural markets but made its own demands in return, such as allowing 
Chinese companies to participate in U.S. insurance and other markets. It also 
seeks looser restrictions on exports to China of sensitive technologies such as 
artificial intelligence. 
 U.S. negotiators have, however, tempered demands and left other 
structural issues for future negotiations, including state-owned enterprises and 
market-distorting subsidies. These thorny issues will not probably give rise to 
very detailed or specific engagements because they are intertwined with the 
Chinese government’s industrial policy. The role of state firms may even 
benefit the U.S. in another part of the trade deal: the purchasing of U.S. goods 
is likely to reinforce the role of the state sector because the purchasing is all 
being done through state enterprises. While the two sides reportedly are also 
near an agreement in which China pledges to have its local governments 
follow WTO rules on corporate subsidies, Chinese negotiators have 
acknowledged that the scope of China’s local government subsidy programs 
is largely unknown, making it all that more difficult to include specific 
commitments in this field (REUTERS, April 16, 2019).  No cure has, to date, 
been found concerning the use by the Chinese government of its judicial 
system and legislations enforcement with the goal of disciplining the domestic 
market and achieving industrial policy objectives. Worse still for the U.S., 
China succeeded in imposing a bilateral monitoring and enforcement 
framework in which each country would have their own enforcement officers 
working in their partner’s region, and the immediate removal of tariffs 
imposed since the beginning of the trade war on various products and 
commodities. This solution guarantees that China will not be held hostage by 
the U.S. administration that could liberally wield tariffs for any perceived 
infraction, and undermine their sovereignty as equal partners (BROWN, 
2019). 
 The challenges of a future trade deal reflect in fact those of a bilateral 
approach, which has to overcome economic, legal and political obstacles.  
 On the legal front, while a trade deal between the U.S. and China 
wrapped up with some optimism, such agreement does not resolve the most 
complex issues between them: intellectual property, technology transfer and 
market access, along with Beijing’s high-tech industrial aspirations. 
 The U.S. accuses China of stealing intellectual property from 
American firms, forcing them to transfer technology to China. To address U.S. 
concerns, Beijing has set up specialized intellectual property courts in various 
cities and recently passes a foreign investment law which makes it harder for 
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Chinese officials to ask foreign firms to transfer their technology to Chinese 
ones. But American lawmakers point to how China’s judiciary is under the 
control of the Communist Party, and legal decisions go the way this Party 
wants them to go, in particular when a state-owned enterprise is involved. The 
enforcement of IPRs will certainly continue to be a major challenge for China.  
 With regard to market access, China’s economic success has been built 
on the back of a centrally planned, targeted approach, designed for its state-
owned companies. That is the opposite of how U.S. companies function. China 
has promised to open up more sectors of its economy to foreign competition, 
but that will be meaningless unless it allows its own companies to operate 
independently. 
 On the economic front, the Trump’s administration should consider 
that it’s not the 80s anymore. Today, the U.S. needs China more than vice 
versa. The U.S.-China relationship is already being challenged by other 
players. Fifteen years ago, China was dramatically underdeveloped, and it 
wanted access to Western technology and manufacturing techniques. Chinese 
industry and services can compete today on the world market, and what China 
doesn’t have it can easily obtain from vendors outside the U.S. While the 
American market looked enticing a few decades ago, it is relatively mature, 
and today other western trading partners constitute strategic substitute, and the 
newer emerging market countries have become much more interesting to 
Beijing (McBRIDE and CHTZKY, 2019). 
 On the political front, China’s trading partners should bear in mind that 
key change of economic rationale will involve radical political changes in 
China. State-sponsored capitalism has been essential to China’s growth and 
economic control. The SOEs function as primary conduits to deliver state-
driven economic policies and stimulus. As a large employer, SOEs are thus 
perceived as a cornerstone of social harmony and control over the Chinese 
society. If the Chinese government withdraws its stranglehold on the 
economy, the Communist Party loses, as a result, its influence over the 
Chinese society through the loss of millions of jobs in the State-owned 
enterprises (FIFIELD and LYNCH, 2019). Ensuring the sustainability of the 
state regime would have often led to the adoption of a “bottom line thinking” 
as it retains strong control to the detriment of economic efficiency, and directly 
affects the legitimacy of the Communist Party’s regime which make China 
unable to fulfill the commitments it made when it joined the WTO in 2001 
(ZHOU, 2019). In such circumstances, it is difficult to see how the future 
arrangement could go, in this field, beyond providing more disclosure to the 
WTO on subsidies. For the US and other global players, internal pressure may 
ultimately be the best impetus for change in China. For some years now, small-
to medium-sized Chinese companies loudly complain that they get squeezed 
out by SOEs, who receive preference in borrowing and on other benefits. 
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 Above all, the agreement currently being finalized will not attenuate 
the rivalry between the two countries. Beijing’s ambitions still strike at the 
heart of the existential problem between the two sides. China’s industrial 
roadmap also called “Made in China 2025” may be the biggest stumbling 
block between the two countries. It has exasperated the U.S., which sees the 
push as a direct challenge to American supremacy in key sectors such as 
aerospace, semiconductors and 5G (McBRIDE and CHTZKY, 2019).  
 In sum, the dialogue between the parties within various institutional 
frameworks has shown more distrust and evident bad faith between the parties 
than the objective to seek closer cooperation and narrow the views. The 
implementation of the bilateral trade agreement will largely depend on the 
stability of political relations, and the willingness of two countries’ leadership. 
The permanent risk of circumventing of its commitments by each party thus 
remains high. Decision-makers seem often keener to focus first and foremost 
on domestic political considerations or nationalist feelings, with the risk to 
empty the agreement of any content. The trade deal, through its enforcement 
offices, will not be able to prevent the U.S. from imposing unilateral sanctions 
against China, nor will it be able to minimise strategic competition between 
the two States.  
The result is that the sword of Damocles is still placed over both sides and 
global economy. That calls for a long-term multilateral binding solution based 
on a depoliticization of trade issues and ensuring more legal certainty and 
predictability for the international trading community.  
 
2) Unilateral Measures 
 Together with tariff increases described above, the United States 
brings indictments against individuals engaging in cyber and physical theft of 
trade secrets for or on behalf of China. Another remedial action consists of 
imposing investment restrictions. The U.S. administration hence instructed the 
Secretary of the Treasury to address concerns about investment in the United 
States directed or facilitated by China in industries or technologies deemed 
important to the United States. The United States began implementing the 
Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act enacted in August 2018 
(FIRRMA) to protect critical American technology and intellectual property 
from potentially harmful foreign acquisitions. It also strengthens the existing 
mechanism – administered by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States (CFIUS) – for reviewing foreign investment in the United States 
for national security purposes and establishes a process for identifying 
emerging and foundational technologies that should be added to existing U.S. 
export controls. The Administration is now implementing this legislation with 
a view toward addressing the concerns regarding state-directed investment in 
critical technologies identified in the Section 301 investigation.  
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 Separately, the United States has actively pursued WTO dispute 
settlement cases involving China. To date, the United States has brought 23 
WTO cases against China and has routinely prevailed in these disputes. The 
U.S. has, for example, recently initiated dispute settlement at the WTO 
challenging China’s discriminatory technology licensing regulations. 
 Challenging China before the WTO dispute settlement body remains a 
critical issue for the United States. In some cases, this State manifestly violates 
WTO rules. In such cases, China is sufficiently respectful of WTO decisions, 
and most of time it brings its policies in line with WTO findings (MERCURIO 
and TYAGI, 2012). At the same time, this assessment should be moderated by 
the persistent difficulty with pressing and winning cases against China given 
the unwillingness of businesses to stand up and be public with their complaints 
for fear of China’s discretion in granting favors and market access (LEVY, 
2019).  
 The major difficulty is not with the enforcement mechanism, but rather 
with incomplete and outdated WTO agreements. Obstacles to address 
subsidies and State-owned enterprises in the current WTO framework are a 
glaring expression of the gap between U.S. aspirations and outcomes.  Many 
of the most harmful policies and practices being pursued by China in these 
areas are not even directly disciplined by WTO rules. Beyond the texts and 
commitments themselves, China runs, in fact, counter to the very rationale of 
the WTO system. The WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism is designed to 
address good faith disputes in which one member believes that another 
member has adopted a measure or taken an action that breaches a WTO 
obligation. This mechanism is not designed to address a trade regime that 
broadly conflicts with the spirit and fundamental underpinnings of the 
multilateral trading system. No amount of WTO dispute settlement by other 
WTO members would be sufficient to remedy this systemic problem (LEVY, 
2019).   
 Two examples suffice to illustrate that any suggestion that the United 
States or other WTO members could address China’s challenges solely by 
relying on the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is naïve in theory, and 
likely to prove downright harmful in practice. First, the United States 
continues to defend U.S. trade remedy laws from attack by China in the WTO. 
These laws are critical to ensure that the costs associated with China’s non-
market policies and practices are not borne by U.S. companies and workers. 
To be more effective, the United States is working closely with the European 
Union (EU) to oppose China’s unfounded WTO challenge against the use of 
non-market economy methodologies in antidumping proceedings. Second, it 
is striking that China has recently indicated its support for proposals that 
would give more power to the WTO’s Appellate Body. In other words, China 
has apparently concluded that the Appellate Body is more likely to protect 
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China’s non-market economic system than to pressure China to change that 
system. 
 
3) International Dialogue 
 In international fora, the United States works with trading partners that 
share its vision to take effective action to address market-distorting practices 
in China. Currently, the United States is working with the EU and Japan as 
part of a new high-level trilateral partnership to address directly the systemic 
distortions caused by China’s non-market economic system. This partnership 
coordinates joint actions and examines potential rules for disciplining a state-
led, mercantilist trade regime where existing rules are ineffective. As this work 
progresses, the three partners intend to reach out to other like-minded WTO 
members. 
 It is worth mentioning that, in comparison with the U.S. position, the 
EU is sharing the same concerns about Chinese market distortions and is 
expressing deep skepticism about China’s commitment to opening its market 
further and assuming greater responsibility in global trade governance, besides 
concern that it seeks to divide the world’s largest trading bloc with its 
economic influence in Eastern Europe. 
 Nonetheless, there are strong differences both in the acceptance of 
China's role as an economic and political superpower, and in remedies limiting 
trade imbalance. European officials suggest that Trump, who has also targeted 
Europe with tariffs, has created a window of opportunity to show that EU-
China relations can be a bulwark for global trade. They urge China, the United 
States and other countries to avoid trade wars and reform the World Trade 
Organization, equipping it to combat forced technology transfers and 
government subsidies, complaints underpinning Trump’s tariffs. While the 
United States claims China’s unfair policies are too urgent and too big for the 
trade body to handle, reforming the rules-based international order as 
regulated by the WTO is the only way for the EU to tackle China’s abuses and 
stand up against Trump’s “America First” policies.  
 Another divergence is the EU’s goal to conclude a bilateral investment 
treaty with China. To that end, Beijing and Brussels have recently submitted 
market access offers for the first time as part of investment treaty talks, hence 
opening a “new phase” in the negotiations that both sides viewed as “a top 
priority” (SHEPHERD, 2018). 
 Few weeks after his inauguration as U.S. President, Donald Trump 
withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a 
“mega” regional free trade agreement that would have established the world’s 
largest free trade zone. The U.S. should promptly rejoin the TPP. Its 
withdrawal from the TPP benefits China for several reasons. The return of the 
U.S. in this forum may provide another leverage effect to discipline China’s 
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policies and practices. China has achieved on the ground a major strategic 
advantage in Asia through its own rival free trade agreement and now will be 
able to write the rules for trade in Asia and possibly beyond. The TPP would 
also have resulted in significant economic gains to the United States as 
supported by a large body of economic studies (CHOW, SHELDON and 
McGUIRE, 2018). 
 The WTO is the cornerstone of the multilateral trading system but its 
rules need to be modernized and some gaps must be filled to ensure a level 
playing field and eliminate unfair practices deployed by China. On the ground, 
recent reform proposals presented by some WTO members seem only 
marginally focused on the China’s problem. While these proposals potentially 
could address some behaviors that make China an irresponsible member of the 
WTO, they do not directly address the serious threat that China and its state-
led, mercantilist trade regime poses for individual WTO members and the 
multilateral trading system.  
 Meanwhile, several reasons suggest that the adoption of multilateral 
rules within WTO fora with the goal to oversee China’s current approach to 
the economy and trade is so far “unrealistic”. 
 Firstly, new WTO rules disciplining China would require agreement 
among all WTO members, including China. However, China has shown no 
willingness to make fundamental changes to its economic system or trade 
regime, and it is therefore highly unlikely that China would agree to new 
disciplines targeted at its trade policies and practices. 
 Secondly, China has a long record of not pursuing ambitious outcomes 
at the WTO. Past agreements, even relatively narrow ones, have been difficult 
to achieve, and when an agreement is achieved, it is significantly less 
ambitious because of China’s participation. One relatively recent example is 
the negotiation to expand the Information Technology Agreement concluded 
in December 2015, but the product coverage was significantly reduced from 
what had been under consideration before China’s involvement. Other 
negotiations do not even lead to an agreement. Rather, they simply reach an 
impasse once China intervenes. The attempt to negotiate an Environmental 
Goods Agreement (EGA) is one example. This negotiation began in July 2014 
with 14 WTO members, accounting for more than 90 percent of global trade 
in environmental goods. 
 Finally, as should be clear, China’s continued insistence that it is a 
developing country significantly hinders the chances of meaningful progress 
in any type of WTO negotiation. In the unlikely event that members were able 
to reach a trade liberalizing agreement at the WTO, it likely would not 
significantly constrain China, as China would insist on availing itself of the 
“special and differential” treatment incorporated for the benefit of true 
developing country members. Moreover, because China refuses to recognize 
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differentiation between varying levels of development among developing 
countries, true developing country members likely would not benefit from the 
most helpful treatment, as China would reject provisions crafted to make 
“special and differential” treatment available in ways targeted to address the 
difficulties that different types of developing country members confront when 
attempting to implement new obligations. 
 
SECTION IV- Recommendations for Promoting a Constructive 
Partnership  
 Previous developments have shown the urgent need for strengthening 
economic relationship between the U.S. and China, but also the absence of 
certainty and sustainability of the solutions proposed by the future trade deal. 
Given the magnitude of their trade and investment links, and their impact over 
global economy, the challenge is to promote the establishment of what we may 
qualify of a “constructive partnership”, the only way to regulate the rivalry or 
antagonism between two superpowers and to ensure a more effective global 
trade governance. China is, simultaneously, in different policy areas, a 
cooperation partner with whom the U.S. has closely aligned objectives, a 
negotiating partner with whom the U.S. needs to find a balance of interests, an 
economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic 
rival promoting alternative models of governance. This requires a flexible and 
pragmatic whole-of-U.S. approach enabling a principled defence of interests 
and values. 
 With this in mind, the success of the multifaceted approach requires a 
shift in the spirit and objectives displayed by both protagonists. The United 
States has to assimilate that the balance of challenges and opportunities 
presented by China has shifted. In the last decade, China's economic power 
and political influence have grown with unprecedented scale and speed, 
reflecting its legitimate ambitions to become a leading global power. The U.S. 
should acknowledge China’s political and economic foundations, and grant 
concessions in sectors considered to be of higher priority by the Chinese 
government.  
 In turn, China can no longer be regarded as a developing country. It is 
a key global actor and leading technological power. Its increasing presence in 
the world, including in the United States, should be accompanied by greater 
responsibilities for upholding the rules-based international order, as well as 
greater reciprocity, non-discrimination, and openness of its system. China’s 
publicly stated reform ambitions should translate into policies or actions 
commensurate with its role and responsibility. The first step forward would be 
the China’s acceptance to give up the “special and differential treatment” it 
enjoys as developing country at the WTO. As a reminder, a “developing 
country” status enables China, among others, to provide subsidies in 
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agriculture and set higher barriers to market entry than more developed 
economies. While Brazil has agreed to forgo the status in exchange for the 
U.S. support in joining the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the recent coalition constituted with India, South 
Africa and Venezuela to make a common front against proposals reforming 
the “special and differential treatment” is becoming unjustifiable given the 
importance and particularities of China’s economy compared with other 
developing countries.  
 Based on these observations, one should draw several consequences 
and perspectives.   
 Unilateral sanctions and measures are not the appropriate solutions 
against China. Such instruments worsen protectionist climate and first punish 
China’s competitors and slow global growth. They also fail to provide 
sufficient deterrence and reverse China’s positions on key issues. In that 
regard, a more efficient use of WTO litigations requires, as a prerequisite, the 
reform of WTO agreements so as to integrate China’s trade policies and 
practices, particularly concerning subsidies, forced technology transfer and 
SOEs.  
 While all bilateral trade mechanisms between the two countries have 
all been cut off since Trump took office, the recent set-up of a binding bilateral 
verification and enforcement mechanism may constitute a new opportunity to 
ensure a more institutionalized and regular dialogue between both parties. To 
work more efficiently than in the past this, however, requires a win-win 
partnership and the acknowledge of Chinese characteristics. Above all, the 
bilateral approach will not lead to exert enough pressure over China to 
modernize, in a substantive manner, its economic and legal framework. But 
despite its deficiencies, the bilateral approach, in particular the enforcement 
offices set up by the trade deal, should be promoted since it can at least uphold 
a smooth and regular dialogue, and provide a standing and regular platform 
for settling future dispute between the U.S. and China. In this respect, trump 
administration’s refusal to make any final trade deal contingent on the 
reopening of discussions on a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with China 
reflects an outdated and inadequate distrust. Such a binding instrument could 
go further than trade deal commitments or WTO disciplines in this area by 
establishing more accurate terms and conditions for foreign investments in 
China by U.S. nationals and businesses, combined with dispute settlement 
provisions enabling a neutral legal recourse mechanism for both individual 
investors and the U.S. government. Despite the administration’s skepticism of 
such mechanism, this may serve as a viable course to hold China accountable 
to its commitments. It is difficult to believe that the enforcement offices set up 
by the future trade deal may constitute an adequate substitute for a binding 
arbitral proceeding. 
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 From a Multilateral perspective, the U.S. and China should continue to 
cooperate towards an effective multilateralism. The U.S., like other major 
partners, including the EU, is committed with China to uphold the rules-based 
international trade order. Accordingly, global players should strengthen 
cooperation with China to meet common responsibilities across all three main 
functions of the WTO: trade negotiations, dispute settlement, and trade policy 
review. China has regularly expressed its commitment towards a fairer and 
more equitable global governance model by adopting market economy 
reforms and taking on a more responsible role at the WTO. At the same time, 
China's engagement in favor of multilateralism is sometimes selective and 
based on a different understanding of the rules-based international order. 
China has often repeated its legitimate request for reforming global 
governance under the aegis of the WTO. But when comes the time to 
modernize WTO agreements to a more adapting world and make more flexible 
negotiations and decision-making processes or to give more participation and 
support to “real” emerging economies, it has not always been willing to accept 
new rules reflecting the responsibility and accountability that come with its 
increased role. Selectively upholding some norms at the expense of others thus 
weakens the sustainability of the rules-based international order. 
 In this context, and to give consistency to their current informal efforts, 
the U.S. and other major players of international trade should promptly 
institutionalize their dialogue and gradually integrate China to their talks 
through the creation of a Joint Working Group on World Trade Organization 
reform. At the same time, if the implementation of such a collaborative 
approach may involve a greater or lesser number of States, the results should 
only be conceived within the framework of the WTO. Even progress and 
concessions made within regional or international fora, such as OECD, APEC 
and G20, will need to be transposed into WTO rules in order to support the 
credibility and coherence of the global trade order. In other words, not only 
the response to China’s challenges must be collective when it comes to leading 
negotiations, implementing any agreement, or imposing sanctions against 
China, but the response should also be ultimately multilateral. 
 The fact that the EU and the U.S. are currently engaged in separate 
bilateral dialogue with China, respectively through a joint working group 
established at the occasion of the 2018 EU-China Summit, and the 
implementation of the trade deal, illustrates the inconsistency of the current 
bilateral-based dialogue aiming to tackle global key and common challenges. 
There is little prospect that one of these instruments produces major impact on 
the ground on China’s most harmful trade practices. The lessons of past 
experience teach us that adopting a unified position through a strategic alliance 
between China’s major trading partners is the only way to put a real pressure 
over China, and the cornerstone of any modernization of its economic and 
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trade regime. A top priority in this regard, and an indicator of China’s 
commitment, would be to start negotiations on stronger disciplines on 
industrial subsidies. Making progress towards changing China’s status of 
“developing country” within the WTO will also be of critical importance.  
 
SECTION V - Conclusion 
 The above discussion suggests, at least, three comments. 
 First, China’s trade regime generates many WTO compliance 
concerns. When compared to the policies of other WTO members, China is 
distorting global markets by prioritizing political considerations over 
economic incentives. China’s industrial and agricultural policies remain 
fundamentally different. In several significant ways, China’s policies go well 
beyond traditional approaches to guiding and supporting domestic industries, 
services and agriculture. In addition, China’s regulatory regime in many 
respects remains opaque, which enables the government to pursue other 
problematic policies and practices that are difficult to uncover. When 
combined with China’s large size and large share of global trade, the U.S. 
authorities consider that the benefits that Chinese industry realizes largely 
come at the expense of China’s trading partners and their companies and 
workers. 
 Second, the China’s position is built on two pillars. On one side, a 
fundamental issue remains the Chinese government and Communist Party’s 
belief that the political value of maintaining a socialist market economy 
together with a State-led and mercantilist approach to trade still outweigh the 
economic costs. The party control is more important than economic growth, 
even though the results have contributed to China’s economic slowdown with 
resources pouring into State companies, thus rewarding inefficiency and 
acting as a drag on China’s performance. Another factor holding reforms back 
might be Beijing’s belief that its industrial policy is giving it an advantage. 
Chinese’s administration thinks that one of the motivations for the U.S. to be 
so aggressive in recent months is that the U.S. also thinks China’s industrial 
policy plans are working.    
 Third, since economic and technological rivalry between two 
superpowers is inevitable, the challenge is to pave the way for a rules-based 
coexistence that eases global trade governance. Convincing China to make the 
needed fundamental changes to its trade regime requires a more constructive 
diplomacy through a multifaceted, long-term and collective approach. In 
several cases, WTO members have had to resort to the WTO’s dispute 
settlement mechanism to change problematic Chinese policies and practices. 
Despite a real success, the use of this tool is sometimes disappointing. China’s 
trade distortions do not often violate WTO agreements, being more related to 
China’s political and legal model not sufficiently liberalized and transparent. 
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While the Trump administration’s trade policy gives the priority to unilateral 
trade barriers and the deadlock of the multilateral trading system as regulated 
by the WTO, it would be more relevant to adopt, among others, the following 
measures: 1) the conclusion of a bilateral investment treaty with China; 2) the 
accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership; and 3) the institutionalization of a 
like-minded States joint working group on WTO reform with the objective of 
revitalizing multilateral rules and governance.  
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